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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“We must act . . . to retain in and return to the community the mentally ill . . . [in 
order] to restore and revitalize their lives.”1  President John F. Kennedy uttered these 
words when addressing Congress on the issue of mental illness and mental 
retardation.2  Following President Kennedy’s suggestion, this country has been less 
than successful in returning the mentally ill to the community and revitalizing their 
lives.  While some people with mental illness may be seen functioning in and 
contributing to society on a daily basis, in schools, the workforce and social settings, 
many are without shelter or a job.  While many members of the community believe 
that persons who are mentally ill are being taken care of and are adequately 
accommodated and protected by the law, they are not.  Persons with mental illness 
face stigma and severely limited opportunities for medical treatment, which might, if 
successful, return them to the world that President Kennedy hoped this country 
would create.  Lack of access to basic mental heath care is a significant barrier.  
While at first glance, the law appears to protect persons from being discriminated 
against because they are disabled, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that 
significant discrimination exists in an area where protection is most needed - health 
insurance.  Currently, health insurance providers are permitted to severely limit or 
even deny health insurance to persons for the sole reason that they have a mental 
illness, have had a mental illness, or in some extreme cases, at some point believed 
they had a mental illness.3  Health insurance providers are permitted to discriminate 
solely on the basis of disability, while this type of discrimination by employers, 
housing providers, and the government has been prohibited or strictly limited since 
the dawn of the discrimination law.  
One in five Americans is affected by mental illness. 4  According to the National 
Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”), approximately 22.1% of adult Americans 
suffer from a mental disorder that would be diagnosable.5  Approximately 9.5% of 
the U.S. population aged eighteen and over suffer from a depressive disorder 
(defined by the NIMH as including major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, 
and bipolar disorder).6 An estimated 13.3% of Americans aged 18-54 suffer from an 
anxiety disorder (defined by NIMH as including panic disorder, obsessive 
                                                                 
1Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, 50 Pub. Papers 
137 (Feb. 5, 1963). 
2See id. 
3See Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental 
Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (2004). 
4John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously 
Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185 (2003) (citing Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 46 
(1999), available at http:// www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html). 
5NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
OF HEALTH, US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, The Numbers 
Count: Mental Disorders in America, NIH Publication No. 01-4584 available at http://www. 
nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). 
6Id. 
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compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
phobias).7 Approximately 1.1% of American adults suffer from schizophrenia.8  
Untreated mental illness can be devastating, and may interfere with family, 
employment, and quality of life in general.9  Despite these dramatic statistics and 
realities, privately insured Americans are not covered for mental health services on 
the same terms as they are covered for physical health services.10  This inferior 
coverage for mental disabilities severely reduces persons with mental illness ability 
to access adequate and proper medical care.11  This lack of proper care further 
reduces disabled persons ability to hold successful and meaningful places in our 
society because of unemployment, homelessness, incarceration, and even early 
death.12  
Discriminatory practices by the insurance industry, such as benefit limits (caps) 
on mental health services coverage, or complete lack of mental health care coverage 
fuel the disparate treatment of those with mental disabilities.  These discriminatory 
practices have been the subject of much debate, and cases challenging those 
principles have not fared well in the court system.13  These insurance practices, 
which single out persons with mental illness and provide them with little or no 
benefits for mental health care, violate the terms of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), and are inconsistent with other laws that seek to remedy 
discrimination against the disabled, such as the Fair Housing Act.     
The following sections will discuss the legislative history of disability law with 
regard to how and why laws protect persons with disabilities.  I will discuss the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and its legislative history.  Then, I will discuss 
interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the arguments commonly 
used for and against mental and physical illness equality in medical insurance 
coverage.  Next, I will provide a comparison of this interpretation with interpretation 
of the Fair Housing Act.  Finally I will suggest continuity and congruence 
throughout disability law to promote a system that lives up to the goals of disability 
protections. 
II.  HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA  
Long before the emergence of disability law, there have been advocates for the 
rights of disabled persons, and recognition of a need for policy to protect disabled 
individuals.14   Significant protection for persons with disabilities first surfaced in 
                                                                 
7Id. 
8Id. 
9Jacobi, supra note 4, at 185. 
10Id. 
11Id. 
12Id. 
13Jennifer Mathis, The ADA’s Application to Insurance Coverage, BAZELON CENTER 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, June 2004, available at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/ 
disabilityrights/ resources/insurance.htm. 
14Laura F. Rotheinstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25 Years, 22 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2000). 
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1973, seventeen years prior to the passage of the ADA in 1990.15  In 1973, sections 
501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were passed.16  Soon after, in 1975, the 
predecessor to the Individuals with Disability Education Act (“IDEA”) was passed.17  
“These two federal statutes moved disability policy from a philosophy of support and 
benefits to one of rights.”18 
Following the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA, federal statutes were introduced 
affecting a nondiscrimination policy in voting,19 air transportation,20 and housing.21  
Both the statutes regarding air transportation and housing addressed discrimination 
in the private sector, which was not addressed by the Rehabilitation Act and the 
IDEA.22  The Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA were also especially significant 
because they demonstrated congressional response to judicial decisions, which 
continued to be the cause of amendments to the statutes during 1970-1990.23  
The policy of ensuring that mentally ill are returned to the community could only 
be effective if incorporated into all aspects of life.24  Statutes providing protection for 
students so that they will receive specialized education to prepare them for college 
and/or the workplace would prove useless if employers were permitted to 
discriminate against these disabled persons after graduation.25  Providing a 
discrimination-free work environment would also be useless if disabled persons still 
faced barriers in transportation and social interactions, such as eating at restaurants.26  
This being recognized, ADA was passed in 1990 to ensure full participation in 
society by individuals with disabilities.27 
                                                                 
15Id. 
1629 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1994). 
1720 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994). 
18Rotheinstein, supra note 14, at 148. 
19The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) 
(providing for accessible voting places for federal elections). 
20The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994) (subjecting airlines to 
nondiscrimination on the basis of disability mandates, was passed in response to the Supreme 
Court decision in Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986), 
which held that indirect assistance to airlines does not subject them to Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
21The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994) (passed in 
part as a response to the Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), a case in which the denial of a special use permit for a group home 
for disabled individuals was struck down as unconstitutional. The need to have a statutory, 
rather than a constitutional basis, to challenge housing discrimination led to the FHAA). 
22Rotheinstein, supra note 14, at 148-49. 
23Id. at 147-48. 
24Id. at 149. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
27Id. at 149-50. 
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The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”28  The 
ADA addresses employment, public services, public accommodations, 
telecommunication, and various miscellaneous areas, one of which is health 
insurance.29 
III.  THE ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
Over the last five years, the Supreme Court has been somewhat successful in 
“disabling” the ADA.   From 1999 when the Court adopted a narrow understanding 
of the class protected by the ADA,30 to 2001, when the Court held that the ADA’s 
employment title was not valid legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,31 the protections for the disabled have been narrowed.  The narrowing 
effect continued in 2001-2002  (the “Disabilities Act Term”)32 when an ADA 
plaintiff’s claim failed against the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations of the 
ADA.33 Critics of the Supreme Court’s analysis of both the ADA and other disability 
laws have argued that the Supreme Court simply does not understand that disability 
rights are civil rights, and that the ADA is a civil rights law.34  If the ADA were 
widely considered to be a civil rights law, greater deference would be afforded to it.  
However, unlike discrimination laws based on race or sex, the Court seems to view 
disability discrimination law as a product of pity for the less fortunate.35  Not only is 
this view a type of discrimination the disabled wish to avoid, but also it has been said 
that it is the very reason the ADA has been uniquely limited as compared to other 
civil rights laws.36   
One area in which the Court has been successful in limiting disability 
discrimination protection is in the field of health insurance.37  The Court Justices 
have limited the ADA’s protections through their interpretation of the statute, prior 
case law, policy, and arguably, because their personal prejudices against disabled 
                                                                 
28Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2004). 
29See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2004) (on employment); 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2004) (on public accommodations); 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2004) (containing the “safe harbor” 
provision). 
30See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
31See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
32See Charles Lane, O’ Conner Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (referring to Justice O’Conner’s reference to “Disability Term”). 
33Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923 (2004). 
34Id.  
35Id. 
36Id. at 924. 
37Mathis, supra note 13. 
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persons.38 To understand the unique limitations placed, it is useful first to examine 
the text of the ADA and the analytical framework used by the court in the area of 
health insurance for all disabled persons.  
A.  Textual Analysis of the ADA 
Since the enactment of the ADA, there has been a great deal of litigation 
surrounding its application to health insurance.39  Specifically, litigation has focused 
on whether the ADA prohibits health insurers from discriminating in the types of 
coverage offered to persons with particular disabilities.40 The section of the ADA 
addressing insurance is unclear at best.  Consequently, courts have been required to 
interpret the language and intent of the statute, and in doing so, have significantly 
narrowed the ADA’s protections by allowing disparity between the protections 
offered to the physically disabled versus the mentally disabled.41  
Though the ADA has achieved significant progress for some individuals with 
disabilities, significant additional progress is needed.42 The main purpose of the 
ADA was to prohibit discrimination against disabled persons in employment, public 
services, and places of public accommodation.43 While its enactment has provided 
significant protections for persons with disabilities, persons with mental disabilities 
still lack significant protection from discrimination in health insurance.44  Titles 
addressing insurance in some form are Title I (employment) and Title III (public 
accommodations).  And most directly relating to insurance is the “safe harbor” 
provision of Title V.45  This section will give an overview of the ADA with respect 
to health insurance.    
1.  Title I 
Health insurance benefits currently offered by many employers seem to violate 
Title I of the ADA on its face.46  Most health insurance plans offered by insurers and 
employers provide significantly less benefits to the mentally disabled as compared 
with the physically disabled.47  
                                                                 
38See generally Bagenstos, supra note 33. 
39Mathis, supra note 13. 
40Id. 
41Id. 
42Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1311 (1991) (noting that the ADA has been called the “Emancipation Proclamation” for 
individuals with disabilities).     
43H.R. REP. NO. 101-336 pt. 2 (1990) (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 303, 419-21). 
44Stuhlbarg, supra note 42. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
46See 42 U.S.C. §12112. 
47Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 
589 (2003).  
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Title I limits employers’ ability to discriminate against disabled persons in hiring 
and firing decisions and obliges employers to provide reasonable accommodations 
for disabled individuals.48  Title I also prohibits “limiting, segregating, or classifying 
a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status 
of such applicant or employee because of [their] disability . . . .” The statute also 
specifically prohibits employers from “participating in a contractual or other 
arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting . . . . a qualified 
applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this title . 
. . .”49  This “includes a relationship with an organization providing fringe benefits to 
an employee.”50  Employer provided health insurance is a fringe benefit of 
employment, therefore, the ADA should prohibit employers from contracting with 
providers of health insurance that discriminate on the basis of disability.  
Despite this seemingly clear prohibition, employers are permitted to contract with 
health insurance companies that limit, segregate, and classify persons based upon 
their disabilities in adverse ways that deny or significantly limit insurance 
coverage.51  Allowing employers to provide discriminatory health insurance benefits 
thwarts the clear purpose of the ADA.      
2.  Title III 
Title III provides, in part, “[no] individual shall be discriminated against on the 
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases . . . or operates a place of public accommodation.”52  
                                                                 
4842 U.S.C §12112. 
4942 U.S.C. §12112(b)(1). 
50Id. 
51See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (containing the “safe harbor” provision). 
5242 U.S.C. § 12182 (2004) in pertinent part reads: 
General rule: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 
Construction: 
General prohibition. 
Activities. 
Denial of participation: It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of 
individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, 
directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the 
opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 
Participation in unequal benefit: It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or 
class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or 
class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the 
opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, 
advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. 
Separate benefit: It shall be discriminatory to provide an individual or class of 
individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, 
directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service, 
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“Public accommodation” is defined only through a list of specific entities that are 
considered public accommodations for purposes of Title III, one of which is an 
“insurance office.”53  Under Title III, discrimination includes “denial of the 
opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.”54 It 
seems clear that disabled persons are protected from discrimination in places of 
public accommodation, including insurance offices.  In order to be 
nondiscriminatory, insurance offices must not deny an individual or class the 
opportunity to participate in or benefit from the good or service provided.  As it will 
be described, the current state of the law is far from consistent with the plain 
language of the statute.  
Further, Title III states that the benefits afforded to the disabled must be equal to 
the benefits afforded to other individuals unless “action is necessary to provide . . . a 
good, service . . . accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that 
provided to others.”55  The distinction between “equal” and “equally effective” is 
made to indicate that something more than equality is demanded by the law.  It is 
easier to see this distinction with regard to physical disabilities.  For instance, stating 
that all persons are welcome to attend a workshop on the second floor would provide 
nothing to a person who is wheelchair bound if there is no elevator.  Similarly, if a 
child with a developmental delay, such as Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) is given 
a written science test identical to that given other students, it would be equal, but it 
would not be equally effective as that provided to other students.56  Accommodations 
are made to ensure that the students are tested on the same playing field, such as 
having the test read aloud.57  Tests and procedures cannot be given in an equal 
manner; if they are to accommodate, they must be different to ensure that testing will 
be equally as effective for the disabled child.58   
Disabled persons should receive the same sort of accommodation in health 
insurance to ensure equally as effective goods and services are being received.  
Current practices in the insurance arena in this country appear to ignore these norms 
and mandates.  Insurance companies are not providing coverage to mentally disabled 
persons that is equal or as equally as effective as coverage provided to the physically 
disabled or people with no disability.   
                                                          
 
facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that 
provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual 
or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or 
accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others. 
5342 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
5442 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 
55Id. at § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
56Interview with Megan Ritz, Special Education Teacher, West Geauga Local Schools, in 
South Euclid, Ohio (Jan. 13, 2005). 
57Id. 
58Id. 
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3.  Title V, The Safe Harbor Provision 
Title V contains a significant provision, commonly known as the safe harbor 
provision.59  On its face, the safe harbor provision provides insurance companies 
with the authority to discriminate when administering health care coverage.60  
Insurers, medical service companies, and similar organizations are not prohibited or 
restricted by Titles I through IV of the ADA with regard to insurance.61  Insurance 
companies are free to act without the ADA’s restraints in underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering risks when evaluating potential clients.62   
While the “safe harbor” provision seems to give insurers the ability to 
discriminate, it contains a limitation that courts have interpreted with difficulty.63  
The limitation states that the provision “shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of title [titles] I and III.”64 The Supreme Court has described “subterfuge” 
as the intent to serve the purpose of discriminating.65 It appears that insurance 
companies can discriminate, but they cannot take advantage of their exemption in a 
way that would show a discriminatory intent under the previous provisions of the 
ADA.  
Legislative history describes the safe harbor provision as providing that a 
disabled person cannot be denied insurance or be subjected to different terms of the 
plan based on his or her disability alone, so long as the disability does not carry any 
increased risks.66  The refusal or limitation must be based on sound actuarial 
principles or must be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.67 The 
                                                                 
5942 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2004) reads: 
Insurance. Titles I through IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or 
restrict— 
an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or 
any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from 
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or 
not inconsistent with State law; or 
a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring, observing 
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting 
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not 
inconsistent with State law; or 
a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring, observing 
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws 
that regulate insurance. 
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of title 
[titles] I and III [42 USCS §§ 12111 et seq., 12181 et seq.].  
60Id. 
61Id. at § 12201(c)(1). 
62Id. at § 12201(c)(2). 
63Id. at § 12201(c). 
64Id.  
65See Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (describing the term 
“subterfuge” with respect to non-fringe-benefit aspect of an employment relationship). 
66H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 137 (1990) (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419). 
67Id. 
272 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 18:263 
legislature gives an example of a blind person, stating that she may not be denied 
coverage based on her blindness if there were no independent or actual risk 
classifications.68 Title V’s safe harbor provision appears to undermine the very 
purpose for which the ADA was enacted.  Because risk is inherent to disability, risk 
should not be a determinative factor on whether or not a person can be discriminated 
against in providing insurance benefits.  
B.  Interpretations of the ADA 
Plaintiffs challenging insurance discrimination in general under the ADA have 
not been successful.69  Courts have offered limited protection of dubious worth to 
disabled individuals with regard to insurance policy coverage.70 Ten federal circuit 
courts have held that employers or insurance companies are not required to provide 
plans that cover all disabilities equally.71  Similarly, district courts addressing the 
issue have found that unequal insurance benefits do not constitute an ADA 
violation.72  The following sub-sections will discuss the various analyses used by 
courts in rejecting these general claims. 
                                                                 
68Id. 
69Mathis, supra note 13. 
70See McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
insurance providers must offer the same product to all potential subscribers); Kimber v. 
Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that employers must offer 
every employee the same plan, regardless of their current or future disability status); Pallozzi 
v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Title III guarantees more 
than mere physical access to an insurance agency and therefore insurers cannot refuse to issue 
a life insurance policy because of the purchaser’s disability status); Ford v. Schering-Plough, 
Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that employers must offer every employee the 
same plan, regardless of their current or future disability status); Carparts Distribution Ctr., 
Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that 
“public accommodation” within the meaning of Title III of the ADA is not limited to physical 
structures and cannot exclude certain disabilities from coverage). 
71See McNeil, 205 F.3d at 188; Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 
1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
an ADA claim challenging an employer’s adoption of an insurance cap on coverage of an 
AIDS-related treatment on the ground that plaintiff was no longer an employee when the 
discrimination in post-employment benefits occurred, but Gonzales was later overruled by 
Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001)); EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 
207 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000); Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101-02; Lewis v. K Mart Corp., 180 
F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envir. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 436 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996); EEOC 
v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.1996); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 
F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996). 
72First Circuit:   
Witham v. Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Inc., Civ. No. 00-268-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7027 (D.N.H. May 31, 2001); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc.,  117 F. Supp. 2d 
92 (D. Mass. 2000); Pelletier v. Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456 (D.N.H. 
Sept. 19, 2000); Connors v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 1999).  But see Boots 
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1.  Disability-Based Distinctions 
Courts have determined that not all disability-based distinctions are 
discriminatory under the ADA.73   Many insurance plans contain distinctions based 
on disabilities, providing varying coverage amounts between both disabled persons 
versus non-disabled persons, and between different types of disabilities.74 In 
determining what is and is not a disability-based distinction, the courts have 
generally narrowed the protections of the ADA.75  
Although normally it is impermissible to treat persons with one class of 
disabilities differently from persons with another class of disabilities, courts have 
permitted distinction between physical and mental illness in the health insurance 
context.76  One court justified the disparity by simply stating that insurers have 
historically made distinctions in offering health and disability coverage.77  Further 
justification is found in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissions’ (EEOC) 
1993 Interim Guidance on Health Insurance.78   
Currently, distinctions between mental and physical disabilities are not 
considered disability-based distinctions, even though a significantly “lower level of 
benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided 
for the treatment of physical conditions.”79  The EEOC reasons that this distinction is 
broad and will have an impact on both individuals with and without a disability; 
therefore, it does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of disability.80  What the 
                                                          
 
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 1999) (denying motion to 
dismiss because capping disability benefits for mental illnesses at 24 months while providing 
such benefits for physical illnesses until the age of 65 could give rise to a claim of 
discrimination under Title III). 
Fifth Circuit:   
Fermin v. Conseco Direct Life Ins. Co., SA-98-CA-0943, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6204, 
*36-40 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2001) (extending the holding in McNeil v. Time Insurance Co., 
205 F.3d 179, 199 (5th Cir. 2000), which held that a health insurance plan that limited 
coverage for AIDS to $10,000 did not violate the ADA, to a long-term disability plan that had 
different coverage for mental and for physical disabilities); Templet v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
of La., CA-99-1400, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15605 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2000). 
Eleventh Circuit:   
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
73Mathis, supra note 13. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116 (citing Rogers, 174 F.3d at 435). 
78See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Interim Guidance on Application of 
ADA to Health Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109 (June 8, 1993), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. 
79See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678 (quoting EEOC’s Interim Guidance). 
80See EEOC Guidance, supra note 78. 
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EEOC and the courts following EEOC guidance do not note is, though there are non-
disabled individuals who may be adversely affected by this distinction, disabled 
persons will absolutely be affected.   
Disability-based distinctions in insurance coverage allow insurance companies to 
discriminate against individuals with certain disabilities by providing them with little 
or no insurance coverage.81  These distinctions have a discriminatory effect upon the 
disabled, as they are the vast majority of those receiving the inferior coverage.82  
Courts must not rely on the EEOC’s guidance or similar tools, as they do not 
properly evaluate the effect that disability-based distinctions have on the disabled. 
2.  Public Accommodations 
Separate and unequal benefits in places of public accommodation are disallowed 
under Title III.83  Access to insurance benefits should be considered a public 
accommodation, and therefore, neither separate, nor unequal benefits should be 
allowed under the ADA.  
Plaintiffs asserting that unequal insurance benefits violate Title III of the ADA 
have seen varying results.84 Three circuits have found that Title III does not apply to 
insurance products, because while the physical premises of an insurance office are 
subject to Title III, the products offered by the insurer are not.85 
The First and Second circuits have found that Title III of the ADA does apply to 
the coverage provided by insurance policies.86  These courts provided some 
protection to the disabled, but the extent of that protection is still very unclear.87  
While the First Circuit held that Title III does apply to the sale of insurance, 
regardless of whether the individual actually enters the structure of an insurance 
office, it did not decide whether Title III applies to the terms and conditions 
contained in that policy.88  The Second Circuit somewhat addressed what the First 
Circuit left open, but with a limiting effect.89  The second circuit held that “an entity 
covered by Title III is not only obligated . . . to provide disabled persons with 
physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by 
reason of discrimination against their disability.”90 This ruling states only that the 
insurance company may not refuse to sell, it does not state that they must sell 
                                                                 
81Susan Nanovic Flannery, Employer Health-Care Plans: The Feasibility of Disability-
Based Distinctions Under ERISA and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 211, 215 (1995). 
82Id. 
8342 U.S.C. § 12182. 
84Mathis, supra note 13. 
85See Ford, 145 F.3d at 614; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014; Lenox, 149 F.3d at 453; Weyer, 
198 F.3d at 115. 
86Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33; Carparts Disrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 19. 
87Mathis, supra note 13. 
88Id. (citing Carparts Disrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 20). 
89Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33. 
90 Id. 
2003-04] THE NEED FOR PARITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE 275 
 
packages to disabled individuals that are as effective as those provided to non-
disabled individuals.91  Overall, the courts have generally concluded that as long as 
the same benefit package is provided to everyone, even though that package may 
provide very different coverage for mental versus physical disabilities, the ADA has 
not been violated.92  Thus, though a claim based on total exclusion from benefits 
might succeed, a claim based on inferior mental health benefits is much less likely to 
succeed.93 
Though circuits are split as to whether disabled individuals have a claim under 
Title III, there is no controversy with regard to insurance benefits that are equal in 
terms but not in effect.94  Title III requires that equal and/or equally effective 
accommodations be provided to those who are disabled.95  Since insurance coverage 
is considered a public accommodation, courts should follow a Title III analysis and 
require insurance coverage that is either equal in terms or effect, whichever provides 
the individual with full and equal enjoyment of the service.  By only offering a claim 
under Title III when there has been a total exclusion from benefits, and not 
considering the equality of terms and effect of the benefit provided, the courts have 
significantly limited the ADA’s protection.96  
3.  The Safe Harbor Provision 
Historically interpretations of the safe harbor provision have severely limited 
plaintiff’s ability to use the ADA to force employers and insurers to offer equal and 
adequate benefits to persons with disabilities.97  The safe harbor provision in Title V 
provides an exemption from the ADA in “establishing, sponsoring, observing or 
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting 
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks . . . .”98  Essentially, as long as a 
disabled person is disabled enough to produce a real financial risk, they can be 
discriminated against because the safe harbor provision provides this outlet.  To 
qualify for the safe harbor, the plan must be consistent with existing state law,99 and 
cannot be used as “subterfuge” to evade the purpose of previous titles of the ADA.100   
                                                                 
91Id. 
92Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33. 
93Mathis, supra note 13. 
94Equal in terms means that, on the face of the insurance package, all terms are equal.  
Equal in effect means that the effect of the terms is equal. (For example, an employer 
offers an insurance plan that contains a $10,000 cap on the treatment of physical 
conditions.  This exact plan is offered to all employees; therefore, it is equal in its 
terms.  However, one employee has cancer and the treatment of her physical 
conditions is sure to exceed $10,000.  The effect of this benefit is now unequal 
because one employee will not receive the benefit as all other employees will.)     
9542 U.S.C. § 12182. 
96Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33. 
97Mathis, supra note 13. 
9842 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
99Id. 
100Id. 
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The EEOC states that “subterfuge refers to disability-based disparate treatment 
that is not justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability.”101  Plaintiffs 
have used this definition to argue that the safe harbor provision is inapplicable where 
differences in benefits are not justified by actuarial data.  Courts have rejected this 
argument finding that there is no requirement that insurers provide actuarial 
justifications for differences in benefits.102   
Some courts have read the safe harbor provision more broadly than the EEOC 
has by defining subterfuge as a “scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.”103  
Consequently, these courts have found subterfuge only when the employer or insurer 
has engaged in intentional conduct in order to carry out some non-insurance related 
discrimination.104  Courts placing an intentional requirement within the definition of 
“subterfuge” have narrowed the provision beyond what was originally intended.105  
4.  The Narrowing Effect 
In general, our society has come to know two major themes about health 
insurance.  First, health insurance is important, and second, having it is good.106  For 
a person who is disabled, “important” is a term that severely understates the value of 
this essential, and just “having it” is not good enough.107  Disabled persons face 
                                                                 
101See EEOC Guidance, supra note 78, at III(c)(2). 
102Ford, 145 F.3d at 611; see also Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 101-05 (refusing to extend 
subterfuge clause to policies created before the adoption of the ADA); Modderno, 82 F.3d at 
1064 (refusing to extend subterfuge clause to policies created before the adoption of the 
ADA); Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d at 271-272 (refusing to extend subterfuge clause to policies 
created before the adoption of the ADA); Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679 (rejecting the EEOC 
guidance on subterfuge because it is “at odds” with the ADA); Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115 
(ruling for defendant on basis of safe harbor provision without applying subterfuge clause).  
But see Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 36 (“[T]he subterfuge clause suggests that, notwithstanding 
compliance with state law, Titles I and III do apply to insurance practices where conformity 
with state law is used as a subterfuge to evade their purposes.”); Zamora-Quezada v. Health 
Texas Med. Group of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (presuming 
safe harbor provision is applicable where defendants engaged in financial practices that 
created cost-cutting incentives to delay or deny services in order to force higher-cost 
individuals with disabilities to go elsewhere, to prevail defendants would have to establish a 
bona fide benefit plan engaged in lawful risk assessment; motion for dismissal or summary 
judgment denied because record does). 
103See Ford, 145 F.3d at 611 (reading based on the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act’s definition of the term, as construed by the Supreme Court in Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. 
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)). 
104See Mathis, supra note 13. 
105Id. 
106See generally, Symposium, Paths to Universal Health Insurance: Progressive Lessons 
from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 205 (2004). 
107Mitchell LaPlante, Health Insurance Coverage of People with Disabilities in the U.S., 
U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Disability and Rehabilitation Research, 
Number 7 (May 1994). 
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serious challenges because of their distinct and substantial need for health care.108  
People with mental and/or physical disabilities are more likely to have low incomes, 
be older, be women, and are much less likely to be employed.109  They have 
particular needs and should have access to the health care system with adequate 
health insurance, while encountering the fewest barriers.110  Other than claiming 
outside of the ADA,111 successful challenges are usually based on total exclusions 
from insurance rather than the inability to attain adequate and proper health 
insurance due to insurance company discrimination.112 Courts have not found any 
provision of the ADA to be applicable to the terms of health insurance plans. 
Consequently, disabled individuals are severely limited in their ability to succeed on 
claims under the ADA with respect to discriminatory practices by insurance 
companies. The following sections will discuss health insurance discrimination 
against the mentally disabled and the effect of that discrimination, as the mentally 
disabled are among the most widely effected by narrow interpretations of the ADA.  
IV.  THE ADA’S NEW OUTCAST: THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
Over the past thirty years, the United States has made significant progress in the 
field of disability rights, most notably through the ADA.113  Though progress has 
been made, there is still widespread discrimination against persons with mental 
disabilities in the United States.114  Though experts in the field have pushed hard for 
disability rights to be viewed as civil rights, the state of our law is far from this 
ideal.115  As discussed above, our court system barely considers disability rights to be 
civil rights, and without this recognition disabled individuals are disadvantaged.  The 
ADA has been much more effective for the physically disabled than the mentally 
disabled.116  
                                                                 
108Kristina Hanson, Uncovering the Health Challenges Facing People with Disabilities:  
The Role of Health Insurance, The People-to-People Health Foundation (November 2003) 
(citing J.A. Meyer and P.J. Zeller, Profiles of Disability: Employment and Health Coverage, 
Washington: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (September 1999)). 
109Id. (recalling the findings of the survey on which her article is based). 
110Id. 
111There may be available action under state anti-discrimination laws, contract theories, 
state insurance claims, and state mental health parity laws. 
112See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 
1996) (holding that safe harbor provision is not applicable in cases of total denial of insurance; 
a complete denial is a per se violation of the ADA’s mandate that employers provide 
individuals with disabilities equal access to insurance coverage). 
113Michael Posner, The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different 
but Equal, 63 MD. L. REV. 203 (2004). 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 186. 
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A.  Allowable Insurance Discrimination Against the Mentally Disabled 
Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he or she has an impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities, if he or she has a record of such 
an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment.117  The statute also 
describes who exactly is covered, and from a plain textual reading of the statute, all 
provisions apply to the mentally disabled as well as the physically disabled.118  
The text of the ADA appears to disallow disparity in health insurance benefits 
between the mentally and physically disabled.119 For one, employers may not 
exclude or deny equal jobs or benefits to a disabled person under the ADA.120  It also 
bars discrimination that denies the full and equal enjoyment of the goods and 
services of places of public accommodation to persons with disabilities (which 
includes an insurance office).121 Mental disabilities such as schizophrenia, attention 
deficit disorder, and autism clearly limit life activities, and these persons are 
regarded as having a disability.  Though the mentally disabled can be just as disabled 
as the physically disabled, recent interpretations ensure that only the physically 
disabled or, in some cases, the severely mentally impaired, will be covered.122  
Common perceptions and prejudices often exclude the “less” mentally disabled from 
this “lucky” group of severely mentally impaired individuals.123     
Current health insurance policies overtly discriminate against the mentally 
disabled.  Often, health insurance policies do not cover mental health care at all, and 
if they do, there is great disproportion in the quality and duration of mental versus 
physical care.  One popular method of discrimination against the mentally disabled is 
time limits on treatment of mental disabilities (durational caps).124  They are usually 
for one or two years, at which point coverage for mental health services is simply cut 
off.  Sometimes this is hinged on whether or not the covered person is currently 
hospitalized for the condition.  
One insurer had a uniform policy of denying disability insurance to anyone who 
had received any mental health services, such as seeing a therapist within two years 
                                                                 
11742 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
118Id. 
119See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (on employment); 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) 
(containing the “safe harbor” provision). 
120See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
121See 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 
122See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 185. 
123See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (reversing a decision 
that found an employee suffering from “carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic 
outlet compression” disabled in part because the lower court disregarded evidence that the 
employee was capable of engaging in household chores such as bathing and brushing her 
teeth); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting a claim that an 
employee denied an opportunity on the basis of a physical impairment was “regarded as” 
disabled unless the employer subjectively assessed the impairment as substantially limiting 
major life activities). 
124Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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of applying for the insurance.125 Another precludes coverage for anyone with an 
occurrence of bipolar disorder more than twice in a lifetime or once within five years 
of applying for the policy.126  Another astonishing example includes a policy that 
denied coverage to “applicants who report having received treatment for a mental or 
nervous condition, regardless of seriousness, within twelve months prior to 
application.”127  Whether the courts or insurance companies want to recognize it, 
overt discrimination in the insurance arena is very present and persistent. 
Various circuits have addressed the issue of disparity between mental and 
physical disabilities in health insurance.  Notable circuit decisions include the Third 
Circuit’s 1998 decision finding that the ADA does not contain a parity requirement 
for mental and physical disability benefits.128  The court held, “[s]o long as every 
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee’s contemporary or 
future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers 
different coverage for various disabilities.”129  The court also opined that the ADA 
does not require equal coverage for every type of disability, and if this requirement 
did exist, it would destabilize the insurance industry.130 In the case of a state’s long-
term disability plan that included a one year cap for mental health care, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the ADA does not require equal benefits for mental and physical 
disabilities, nor does it mandate that the plan sponsors justify risk classification with 
actuarial data.131    
These and similar holdings have been justified with the legislative history of the 
ADA.132  These committee reports have expressed the view that “employee benefits 
plans should not be found to be in violation of [the] legislation . . . simply because 
they do not address the special needs of every person with a disability.”133  Courts 
also looked to the EEOC’s interim guidance on the ADA’s application to health 
insurance.134  EEOC’s guidance offers little support for equality.  It states, health 
insurance plans distinguishing between the benefits provided for the treatment of 
physical and mental conditions do not violate the ADA.135  
The Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue in the widely cited case, Parker v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.136  In Parker, the plaintiff/employee suffered 
                                                                 
125Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).  
126Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 950 F. Supp 422 (D.N.H. 1996). 
127Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998). 
128Ford, 145 F.3d at 610. 
129Id. at 608. 
130Id. 
131Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 432, 437 (4th Cir. 1999). 
132Id. at 434 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 137 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420). 
133Id. 
134See generally EEOC Guidance, supra note 78. 
135Id. at Sec. 8. 
136Parker, 121 F.3d at 1006. 
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from severe depression.  The employee challenged her employer’s long-term 
disability plan, which capped mental disability benefits at one year unless the insured 
was hospitalized.137  The very same plan provided benefits for physical disability 
care until age sixty-five.138  The court held that the ADA only prohibits 
discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled, not between various 
disabilities.139   
In a Seventh Circuit decision, an employee suffering from severe depression and 
bipolar disorder challenged her employer-provided plan that also capped mental 
disability benefits at two years while providing physical health benefits to the age of 
sixty-five.140 The court stated that, though the great disparity in long-term benefits 
between the physically versus the mentally disabled “may or may not be an 
enlightened way to do things,” the disparity was not discriminatory.141  The court 
admitted the narrow scope of the ADA with regard to the inferior coverage offered to 
persons with mental disablies, but ultimately found that the distinction between 
physical and mental health care coverage was not in violation of the ADA.142  
Remarkably, the court further stated, “although such distinction may have a greater 
impact on certain individuals with disabilities, they do not intentionally discriminate 
on the basis of disability and do not violate the ADA.”143  We must ask ourselves, 
how much more intentional can written provisions in insurance policies that limit 
and exclude particular disabled persons from an opportunity to attain health 
insurance be?  
The Ninth Circuit offered an offensively simple approach to the complex and 
important issue of mental illness discrimination in heath insurance.  In similar facts 
as the Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions, the court found that “there is no 
discrimination under the [ADA] where disabled individuals are given the same 
opportunity as everyone else.”144  As long as insurance distinctions are applied to all 
employees, then they cannot be discriminating.145  Furthermore, in seeming support 
of insurance company concerns, the Ninth Circuit went on to support its holding by 
stating, [“]insurers have historically and consistently made distinctions between 
mental and physical illness in offering health and disability coverage.”146  Is the court 
really using a historical basis to justify their determination?  How simple the law 
would be, if history and consistency were truly our only precedent, for the people of 
this country would have not a single civil right. 
                                                                 
137Id. 
138Id. 
139Id. at 1015-16. 
140EEOC v. CAN Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). 
141Id. at 1044. 
142Id. at 1045. 
143Id.  
144Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000). 
145Id. 
146Id. 
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The Tenth Circuit, in similar facts and with the support of these various circuits 
also found in favor in the defendant/employer.147 The court reasoned that even 
though the plan does make a distinction between different types of disabilities, this is 
far different than an employee facing differential treatment due to her disability.148 
The Tenth Circuit clearly has missed the point that not only is this type of 
discrimination the very essence of differential treatment, but is one of the worst kind.  
The Tenth Circuit appears to be comparing a demotion or name-calling to the denial 
of health insurance benefits.  
When addressing similar issues, some circuits have been confronted with §504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act.  A plaintiff in the District of Columbia Circuit claimed that 
her employer provided health insurance plan violated section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act in that the plan placed a cap of $75,000.00 for mental health care, 
and no similar limit existed for physical health benefits. 149  Section 504 states, “No 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely 
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from . . . participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any . . . program or activity 
conducted by an executive agency . . . .”150  Despite the plain language of Section 
504, the court found that disparities in health insurance coverage between the 
mentally and physically disabled were no different than generalized limits, which are 
permissible. 151 
These decisions have destroyed what little protection is provided to persons with 
mental health disabilities.  The lack of coverage by insurance companies and 
disregard of the problem by courts may largely be due to the very prejudices and 
discriminatory practices creators of the ADA wished to avoid.  Mental illness is 
often viewed not as a disease, but rather a personal weakness or lack of character.152 
Widespread lack of knowledge about mental diseases and disabilities feeds much of 
the avoidance, disregard and prejudice against the mentally disabled.153 This 
widespread lack of knowledge clearly exists within the insurance industry and the 
court system.      
B.  Effects on Health   
Not only have the recent decisions resulted in further discrimination against the 
disabled, they have an adverse effect on mental health.  The National Institute of 
Mental Health agrees that the majority of people with a mental disorder can be 
                                                                 
147Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101-02.  
148Id. 
149Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1060. 
15029 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2001). 
151Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062. 
152Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA: Achieving Parity with Respect to Mental 
and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 349 (2001). 
153Id. at 371. 
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diagnosed and effectively treated through psychotherapy and medication.154  Many 
people fail to recognize that mental illness is a disease of the brain.155  “Brain 
research demonstrates that disorders as different as stroke, anxiety disorders, alcohol 
addiction, anorexia, learning disabilities, and Alzheimer’s disease all have their roots 
in the brain.”156  The Institute further states, “Every American will be affected at 
some point in his or her life, either personally or by a family member’s struggle, with 
a brain disorder.”157  Though mental illness it is often trivialized and is left untreated 
because of this misconception, effective treatments are available for almost all 
mental disorders, especially those most common, such as anxiety disorder.158 
Untreated, a mental brain disorder usually becomes more and more disabling, and 
eventually can lead to severe depression, alcoholism, drug use, or commonly 
suicide.159   
Research has shown that more than 90 percent of people who commit suicide 
have depression or another diagnosable mental or substance abuse disorder, often in 
combination with other mental disorders.160  The majority of people “who have 
received treatment for mental illnesses show genuine improvement over time and 
lead stable, productive lives.”161  
Untreated or mistreated mental illness can have devastating results. Treatment for 
mental disabilities has proven effective, and scientific knowledge in the area is 
extensive. But, since Americans rely primarily on health insurance to pay medical 
bills, and insurance coverage excludes or greatly limits mental health coverage, these 
effective and approved treatments are not utilized as they should be.   
C.  Effects on Employment 
One of the main goals in passing the ADA in 1990 was to increase employment 
opportunities for people with disabilities who wanted to, and could, work, but were 
being kept out of the job market because of discrimination on the basis of 
disability.162 It has become clear that the goal for protection from employment 
discrimination based on mental disabilities has not been met.  This attempted 
                                                                 
154National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), National Institute of Health, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services:  Health Information, available at http://www. 
nimh.nih.gov/HealthInformation/ index.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). 
155Id. 
156Id. 
157Id. 
158Id. 
159Id. 
160Id. 
161Signorello, supra note 152, at 370. 
16242 U.S.C. § 12101. 
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protection has even been called a “delusion of rights,” rights that never really 
existed.163  
When the ADA was being considered, research submitted to Congress cited 
discrimination as a significant cause of the striking level of unemployment among 
people with disabilities.164  Research has also shown that people with psychiatric 
disabilities are subject to more severe employment discrimination than people with 
other types of disabilities.165  Yet, analysis of reported cases and research supports 
the conclusion that people with mental disabilities have received little benefit from 
the ADA’s protections against employment discrimination.166  In a 1999 survey 
encompassing cases regarding potential discrimination by employers under the 
ADA, employers prevailed 95.7% of the time in federal appellate court.167 
Discrimination against the mentally disabled hinders the opportunity to be employed, 
which has a negative effect on the job market.   
In order for a disabled person to be protected under the ADA, he or she must be 
capable of performing the essential functions of the job.168  Therefore, even if the 
ADA covers the employee’s illness, if he is incapable of performing the essential 
functions of the job, he is unable to take advantage of the ADA’s protections.169 
Currently, many mentally disabled persons in and out of the workplace are not 
receiving adequate and appropriate medical care due to the lack of coverage in their 
health insurance plans.  When an employee is not treated for a mental illness she is 
less likely to be able to perform the essential functions of her job.  Essentially, this 
allowable discrimination in health insurance coverage is creating a class of mentally 
disabled persons who are not protected under the ADA in an employment setting.  
They are unable to hold jobs, which is directly contravening the purpose for which 
the legislation was enacted.  This type of discrimination is the quintessential “vicious 
circle”.   The fact is, if these persons had the opportunity to receive proper medical 
care, many of them would be able to function in their job, in society, and in life.   
V.  A COMPARISON:  THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE ADA 
Adequate health insurance and adequate housing are both essential components 
of a safe and healthy life.  As indicated, a mentally disabled person is likely to 
encounter many barriers when attempting to attain adequate health insurance due to 
his or her disability.  On the other hand, a mentally disabled person is unlikely to 
encounter barriers due to discrimination when attaining adequate housing.  
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Housing is one of our basic needs. Currently in the United States, there are 
approximately 274 million people living in approximately 105 million owned or 
rented units.170  This is approximately 97.5% of the population, according to the 
2000 Census.171  Because shelter is a recognized basic need, the Fair Housing Act 
Amendments of 1988 requires equality for the disabled living in, buying, or renting a 
dwelling.   
In 2003, approximately 243 million people had health insurance,172 which is 
approximately 86.5% of the population.173  There is a strong argument that health 
insurance is a basic need as well.  At the very least, it is a need, utilized by the vast 
majority of our population, which deserves adequate and supportive measures 
against discrimination.  The court, legislature, and persons able to acquire adequate 
insurance have an easier time dismissing health insurance as a benefit rather than a 
necessity.  It is those who do not have adequate health insurance, like the mentally 
disabled, who realized how very necessary the “benefit” really is.   
The Fair Housing Act has done a stellar job making it clear that fair housing is a 
basic need deserving of protection.  The policy choice was likely made easier 
because, generally, people understand the importance of shelter. Since the ADA and 
the Fair Housing Act Amendments are comparable in purpose and in statutory form, 
a comparable application should follow.  The following sections will look at the Fair 
Housing Act Amendments, and discuss the disparity seen between decisions 
interpreting it and those interpreting the ADA.  
A.  Background of the Fair Housing Act Amendments  
The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, during a time in which our country 
was headed toward a sharp divide between races.174 The Fair Housing Act banned 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin in the hopes of 
creating a truly integrated society.175  “Handicap” was added in 1988 via the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA).  The Amendments were seen as “a clear 
pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of 
persons with handicaps from the American mainstream.”176  
The definition of “handicap” under the Fair Housing Act Amendments and the 
definition of “disability” under the ADA are identical. Both definitions arise out of 
the definition provided in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which was intended to 
cover the widest possible range of disabilities that limit activities such as walking, 
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seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.177  It was also intended 
to include a wide variety of impairments, including a range of physiological 
disorders and conditions such as mental retardation, emotional and mental illness.178  
Under the Fair Housing Act Amendments and the ADA, a “handicap” or 
“disability” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of such person’s major life activities, there is a record of such impairment, or the 
person is regarded as having such impairment.179  The courts that have interpreted 
these definitions have done so broadly and have included physical and mental 
impairments such as those who are substantially limited by alcoholism, emotional 
problems, mental illness, learning disabilities, and many difficulties associated with 
old age.180  Yet there appears to be a trend toward defining “disability” more 
narrowly under the ADA than it is under the Fair Housing Act Amendments. 
Though the language in the statutes is identical, the application of, and therefore 
the protections offered have been strikingly different.  Allowable practices under the 
ADA support overt discrimination against the mentally disabled.  On the contrary, 
court interpretations of the FHAA have not permitted such discrimination.  The 
FHAA has been interpreted to disallow discrimination against mentally disabled to 
the exact same degree as physically disabled persons.  
B.  Applications of the FHAA  
Both the ADA and the Fair Housing Act Amendments addressing disability are 
based on the same fundamental principle, which is, ending discrimination against 
persons on the basis of disability. Though the language and proposed intent of the 
ADA and the FHAA are identical, the laws as applied to both physically and 
mentally disabled persons, are very different. 
Under the FHAA there truly is no distinction between mental and physical illness 
with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate, and fair housing.   Housing providers 
may not refuse to deal with people because they are disabled, whether physically or 
mentally.181  As we have seen, this is a practice that is not prohibited under the ADA 
with regard to health insurance.   
1.  Nondiscrimination Under the FHAA 
Housing providers may not ask whether the applicant has a disability or is 
associated with anyone who has a disability, nor may they inquire into the nature or 
severity of a disability.182  This restriction does not prohibit inquiry into an 
applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy, provided the 
inquiry is made of all applicants, whether or not they have handicaps.  Current case 
law exemplifies the narrow exceptions to the confines created by the FHAA. 
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One example is that housing providers, unlike health insurance providers, may 
not inquire into the nature of disability.  In Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority, a 
city housing authority was held to have violated the Fair Housing Act 
Amendments183 by denying housing to certain individuals who had physical or 
mental disabilities.184  These persons were denied on the grounds that they failed to 
satisfy a criterion of being able to live independently.185  The housing authority 
determined potential tenants’ ability to live independently by requiring them to 
answer detailed inquiries regarding the nature and scope of their disabilities and to 
authorize the release of medical information.186  The court held that a portion of the 
authority’s manual entitled “Standards for Tenant Selection Criteria” requiring an 
applicant to demonstrate an ability “to live independently” violates federal statutes 
and is contrary to federal regulations concerning discrimination in housing and must 
not be utilized in the tenant selection process.187  
Following strict application, the FHAA is violated upon a showing of 
discriminatory intent.  In Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and 
Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield, the court stated that a plaintiff could 
establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act Amendments188 by showing 
discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact.189  The court explained that, under 
discriminatory intent analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that his or her 
handicapped status was one factor, not the sole factor, in the defendant’s decision.190  
Also, the court added that an undesirable discriminatory intent could be 
demonstrated through an inquiry into certain factors; specifically, (1) discriminatory 
impact, (2) the historical background of the decision, (3) the sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departures from normal procedural 
sequences, and (5) departures from normal substantive criteria.191  The court further 
explained that, to prevail on a claim of discriminatory treatment, the plaintiff is not 
required to show that the defendant was motivated solely, or even predominantly, by 
the plaintiff’s handicapped status. It is sufficient only to show that such status was a 
motivating factor in the defendant’s action.192  If this analysis were to be used under 
the ADA with regard to its application to health insurance providers, plans that 
distinguished mental and physical illness would be deemed discriminatory. 
Further, the court has expressly stated that exceptions to the FHAA are to be 
narrowly construed.  In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., a former resident of a group 
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home for the mentally handicapped, challenged certain restrictions that the defendant 
city had imposed as a condition of the issuance of a special permit to live in a 
residential district.193  The court stated that the exceptions to the Fair Housing Act 
Amendment’s prohibitions on discrimination should be narrowly construed.194  The 
court held that restrictions on housing for persons with disabilities, which are 
predicated on public safety, cannot be based on blanket stereotypes about the 
handicapped, and the restrictions must be tailored to particularized concerns about 
individual person with disabilities.195  Further, the court noted, any special 
requirements placed on housing for the handicapped, based on concerns for the 
protection of the disabled, must be unique to the needs associated with particular 
kinds of disabilities.196  The Fair Housing Act Amendments are unwilling to 
compromise a disabled person’s right to fair housing.  The ADA should follow a 
similar unwillingness to compromise a disabled person’s right to adequate health 
insurance.     
Under the ADA, willingness to compromise overwhelms the meager protections 
offered to the mentally disabled.  Through insurance practices, the ADA has 
compromised the rights of the very person it professes to protect.  If housing 
providers may not refuse tenants based on their disability, why do we allow an 
insurance company to do just that?  It is unthinkable that a landlord would be 
permitted to tell a tenant that, since he or she has bipolar disease, he or she is too 
risky and therefore not a desirable candidate to live in this dwelling.  Yet, insurance 
companies are statutorily permitted to use financial risks to deny or limit the 
coverage they provide to the mentally disabled. 
A housing provider may only refuse to rent to a person who possess a significant 
risk of causing physical harm to others, or substantial physical damage to the 
property of others.197  There are no health concerns or safety risks to physical 
property in providing equal health coverage to the mentally and physically disabled.  
Exceptions provided by the FHAA are based on a significant risk to health, safety, or 
property.  Though the FHAA is partially motivated by financial risk, house reports 
indicate that this provision was not intended to permit housing to be denied based on 
presumptions.  It is impermissible for a landlord or landowner to deny housing on a 
presumption that handicapped people generally pose a greater threat to the health, 
safety and/or property of others than non-handicapped buyers or renters.198 
Alternatively, the ADA’s exceptions are based on presumptions that disabled people 
pose a greater financial risk. 
2.  Real Accommodations 
The Fair Housing Act Amendments declare it unlawful to refuse to make 
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when the 
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accommodation is necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use 
and enjoy a dwelling.199  A plaintiff bringing a claim against a housing provider for 
refusing to make a reasonable accommodation, in addition to showing the 
accommodation is reasonable must also show that: (1) the plaintiff suffers from a 
handicap, (2) the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to have known of 
this handicap, (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the 
plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing involved, and (4) the 
defendant refused to make such an accommodation.200  When shown, the FHAA may 
require landlords to assume reasonable financial burdens in accommodating 
handicapped residents.201 Also, the public use and common use portion of all multi-
family dwellings must be readily accessible and usable by handicapped persons.202   
Further, the FHAA specifically makes it unlawful to refuse to permit, at the 
expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications to existing premises 
occupied or to be occupied by such a person if such modifications are necessary to 
afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.203  With respect to rental housing, 
the FHAA provides that a landlord may, where reasonable, condition permission for 
a modification on the lessee’s or tenant’s restoration of the interior of the premises to 
the condition that existed before the modification, reasonable wear and tear 
excepted.204  The purpose of such allowance and requirements is to ensure every 
disabled person an equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling.205  These FHAA 
allowances and requirements of reasonable accommodations make no distinction 
between the mentally and physically disabled, and essentially allow a disabled 
person to buy a “better” plan if need be.  
No such accommodations or allowance of accommodation at the disabled 
person’s expense exist under the ADA.  The vast disparity between the application of 
the FHAA and the ADA’s application to health insurance coverage has been 
exemplified in current case law. 
In Samuelson v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Co., plaintiff was forced to break his lease 
early due to a serious deterioration in his mental condition, which made it unsafe for 
him to continue living in the apartment for the remainder of his lease.206  The court 
found that the plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim of handicap discrimination 
under the FHAA by alleging that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate 
him by waiving an assessment of rent for the remainder of his lease.207  In the 
interest of protecting the rights of the disabled, the court will decide against a 
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landlord even if it poses some financial inconvenience.  With regard to the ADA, the 
court offers no such disposition. 
Under the FHAA, meaningful access is important to the court.  In Oconomowoc 
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Greenfield, the court concluded that a state 
zoning requirement (that 2,500 feet should exist between community-based 
residential facilities) was discriminatory against (mentally disabled) adults.208  The 
court concluded that by substantially limiting meaningful access to housing for the 
developmentally disabled, the spacing requirement was discriminatory.  The court 
held that special zoning permission was a reasonable accommodation under the 
FHAA.  Reasonable accommodations have been repeatedly provided for the 
mentally disabled,209 just as the physically disabled have been accommodated under 
the FHAA. 
The FHAA has been construed very broadly with regard to accommodating both 
the physically and mentally disabled equally.  All allowances, such as allowing 
reasonable modifications to be made, or requirements, such as reasonable 
accommodation in rental policies are applied to both mentally and physically 
disabled persons.   
Recall, under Title I of the ADA, employers are obligated to provide reasonable 
accommodations for disabled individuals in the workplace.210  This obligation should 
apply equally to both the mentally and physically disabled, as it applies under the 
FHAA. The FHAA and the ADA’s use of “reasonable accommodations” is derived 
from interpretations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.211  Both the FHAA and the 
ADA came after the Rehabilitation Act, and were at least in part, derived from it.  
Yet, the ADA does not require reasonable accommodations to be applied equally to 
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both mentally and physically disabled persons in health insurance.  Because health 
insurance companies create coverage that is not applied equally, their policies are 
discriminatory. 
3.  A Simple Test 
The FHAA not only protects persons searching for housing, but it also ensures 
their right to equal treatment once they become residents.212  It is unlawful to 
“discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with 
such dwelling, because of a handicap.”213   According to the HUD regulation, it is 
unlawful to “deny or limit” housing-related services based on any FHAA-prohibited 
factor.214  The practices covered by this prohibition include “limiting the use of 
privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling . . . .”215  Even evictions 
based on nondiscriminatory and generally acceptable reasons, such as failure to pay 
rent on time, unruly behavior, and poor housekeeping, may violate the FHAA so 
long as the conduct is attributable to the resident’s disability and could be remedied 
by a reasonable accommodation.216  Further, “reasonable accommodations” ensure 
housing equally as effective for all disabled persons. 
Recall that, currently, insurance companies are permitted to underwrite risks, 
classify risks, and administer such risks into the terms of a benefit plan.217  The 
legislative history of the ADA notes that insurers may limit coverage based on 
“classification of risks” and may refuse to insure, limit insurance, or charge a 
different rate based on an individual’s disability when such practice is based on 
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated 
experience.218  This simple test consists of examining the effect on insurers’ practices 
if they were to practice as housing providers under the FHAA, and then examine the 
effect on housing providers’ practices if they were to practice as insurers under the 
ADA, as interpreted.   
Under FHAA restraints, a health insurance company would not be permitted to 
discriminate against persons seeking a benefit plan.  This means insurance providers 
would not be permitted to ask an applicant if she has a disability, or if she is 
associated with anyone who has a disability.   Nor may the insurance provider 
inquire into the nature or severity of a disability.219  This restriction would not 
prohibit inquiry into an applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of the plan 
(namely payment) provided the inquiry is made of all applicants, whether or not they 
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have disabilities.  Further, the insurance provider would be unable to limit the use of 
privileges and services of the policy in a discriminatory manner.220  This would mean 
that durational caps, such as a two-year cap on mental health coverage as opposed to 
coverage for physical disabilities until the age of sixty-five, would be prohibited.  
Distinguishing between mental disabilities and physical disabilities in health 
insurance plans would be deemed discriminatory, in violation of the statute, and 
disallowed. 
Let us hypothesize that the ADA mandates are utilized in fair housing.  Under the 
ADA structure, a housing provider has the authority to ask if an applicant has a 
disability, and inquire into the nature and severity of the disability.221  Upon inquiry, 
if the housing provider deems this disability, and the behavior stemming from it, as a 
risk to him financially, he may refuse this person housing, limit his offer, or charge 
this person a higher rate so long as it is based on sound actuary principles.  The law 
permits him to openly discriminate by denying housing to this person based on a 
particular disability.   
This is the norm for insurance companies today.  The comparison is shocking.  
Current discriminatory practices by health insurance companies are inexcusable.  
Their practices need to be curbed, in the same fashion and under the same constraints 
posed and practiced by housing providers under the FHAA. 
C.  The FHAA and Home Insurance Discrimination 
Home insurance discrimination claims have been brought both under the ADA 
and the FHAA.  Claims brought under the FHAA, have seen much more success, 
than those brought under the ADA.  For instance, claims requesting reasonable 
accommodations by housing insurance companies have been much better received 
under the FHAA.  
Insurance companies have attempted to side step the law in home insurance 
practices.  Companies have refused to write insurance, or have charged higher rates 
to disabled persons or to housing providers with disabled tenants.222  In Wai v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., relying on the ADA, a district court held that the FHAA bars 
insurance companies from refusing to provide standard insurance at ordinary rates to 
landlords with disabled tenants.223  The court held that this type of insurance 
discrimination violated the FHAA’s “otherwise make unavailable” and 
“discriminatory terms-and-conditions” provisions as well as its “reasonable 
accommodations” mandate.224 This case exemplifies the intolerance for 
discriminatory activity of FHAA enforcers. 
In Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. GE Financial Assurance Co., the court 
did not find a violation in the insurance company’s activity.225  An insurance 
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company was sued for not changing its long-term nursing home care indemnity 
policy to cover a disabled resident.226  The court held that the reasonable 
accommodation provision was not violated because the defendant offered equal 
coverage to disabled and non-disabled persons (i.e., neither group was covered).  The 
Avalon opinion relied on a decision that had interpreted an ADA provision 
forbidding businesses from denying people with disabilities the full and equal 
enjoyment of goods and services.  Relying on ADA interpretation, the court found 
the discriminatory insurance practice lawful.   
Courts that rely on the ADA for interpretation of the FHAA have encountered 
criticism.227  It has been professed that not all courts agree that the ADA provision 
cited in Avalon is as limited as the Fifth Circuit held.228 Also, Avalon’s reliance on 
this ADA provision to interpret the FHAA’s reasonable accommodations provision 
seems questionable.229  As seen in Avalon, when relying on the ADA for 
interpretation, it is more likely that a discriminatory insurance practice will be 
deemed lawful.  The FHAA, by its terms, goes beyond the simple denial of access; it 
requires changes in a defendant’s “rules, policies, practices, or services” that may be 
necessary to afford a disabled person equal housing opportunities.230 The disabled 
persons’ right to home insurance was jeopardized in this case because of reliance on 
discriminatory ADA interpretation, but there is hope that FHAA interpretations will 
prevail in the future.231 
Scholars have suggested that Avalon’s narrow interpretation of the FHAA will 
not be the end of the matter.232  “The type of claim made there (in Avalon) - that an 
insurance underwriter may be required by the FHAA to modify the coverage it offers 
if necessary for a person with a disability to secure a housing unit - may be expected 
to be presented on a regular basis.”233  It may be expected on a regular basis in the 
context of housing.234  What about in the context of health?  FHAA mandates and 
interpretations appear to have more understanding and awareness of the needs of 
disabled people and the purpose of the legislation than ADA mandates and 
interpretations have revealed. 
V.  A GROWING PROBLEM 
In prior years, the ADA has been repeatedly brought into question regarding 
discriminatory insurance practices, most recently regarding monetary caps on 
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coverage for AIDS.235  As AIDS awareness rose, discrimination against those with 
AIDS became an issue, and effectuated a demand for fairness in insurance policies.  
While AIDS patients still encounter insurance discrimination, some federal courts 
have invalidated insurance company caps on lifetime benefits for AIDS treatment.236  
The mentally ill have since assumed the position of those suffering from AIDS.  
Recently, like AIDS, with increasing awareness, discrimination against the mentally 
disabled in health insurance has increased.  This awareness will grow as the numbers 
of those affected continues to rise.  As indicated above, one in five Americans is 
affected by mental illness, and more than five percent of American adults have a 
serious mental illness so severe that it interferes with social functioning.237  These 
numbers can be expected to rise in upcoming years.238   
According to the 2000 Census, more than 35 million people in the United States 
(12% of the total population) are over 65 years old.239  This number will continue to 
rise dramatically when the “baby boomers” reach retirement age.240  In the first three 
decades of the twenty-first century, the number of seniors will double, and the age 
group will compose one-fifth rather that one-eighth of the overall population.241  
Disability status is highly correlated with old age.242  
Census data shows that, as people get older, their likelihood of having a disability 
increases substantially.243  Between fifteen to twenty percent of elderly people in the 
United States suffer from significant symptoms of mental illness.244  Also, the 
highest suicide rate in America is among those sixty-five and older.245  Elderly 
people lead the World Health Organization’s list of new cases of mental illness.  
Between the likely increase in senior population, and an overall increase in 
awareness of mental disabilities, the demand for equality and fairness in health 
insurance for the mentally disabled is not only unlikely to retreat, but will likely 
intensify. 
VI.  PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
The ADA was enacted to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities in light of 
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historical tendency to isolate and segregate these individuals.246  Similarly, the 
FHAA was a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary 
exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream because 
individuals with handicaps “have been denied housing because of misperceptions, 
ignorance and outright prejudice.”247  These mandates are equal in their purpose, 
rationale, and language, yet, their treatment of mentally versus physically disabled 
persons has been vastly different. Under the FHAA, there truly is no distinction 
between mental and physical illness with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate, 
and fair housing.  Accordingly, the ADA should not permit a distinction to be made 
between mental and physical illness with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate, 
and fair health insurance.    
“Because a basic feature of our health insurance industry is classification based 
on health, its relation to the nondiscrimination mandate of the ADA raises difficult 
issues.”248  The safe harbor provision disturbs the statutory framework by exempting 
traditional, discriminatory insurance practice from Title I constraints.249  It was not 
included in the original bill but was later added “to reassure the insurance industry 
and other covered entities that the ADA would not disturb current insurance 
underwriting practices.”250  The safe harbor provision was inserted into the statute 
“to curb the effect of the broad-reaching employment title on the provision of 
employee insurance benefits.251   
The inclusion of the safe harbor provision into the ADA appears to have been 
motivated, at least in part, by the insurance lobby.252  According to an interview of a 
member of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee on Disabilities 
Policy, in 1992, the insurance amendment (the safe harbor provision) was developed 
in response to insurance group lobbying.253  The insurance industry actually assisted 
the Committee in drafting the actual language of the provision, no hearings were 
held on the insurance issue, and the legislative history does not document the initial 
development of the language.254  These insurance provisions were included in the 
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final version of the ADA which passed in both houses on July 17, 1990, and was 
signed into law by President Bush nine days later.255 
The power of the insurance lobby cannot be denied.  An equally powerful lobby 
of pro-consumer agencies, groups, and professions must be created to counter the 
law which the self-interested insurance lobby created; the law that permits 
discrimination.  This lobby might include for example, NAMI (National Alliance for 
the Mentally Ill), AAPD (American Association of People with Disabilities), AARP, 
(American Association for Retired Persons), American Psychiatric Association, 
Doctors, Nurses, Employer, or Unions.  The lobby should support legislation 
mandating equality in insurance benefits for the mentally ill by either amending or 
reconstructing the safe harbor provision.  Lobbying efforts should begin at the state 
level, as the likelihood of successful legislation on a state level is greater than such 
legislation on a federal level. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Health insurance is a basic need for sustaining a healthy and productive life.  
Americans rely on health insurance to provide them with medical care for the flu, 
broken bones, giving birth, life threatening illnesses, and many other problems. 
Americans who experience, for example, social withdrawal, inability to sleep, 
delusions, hallucinations, extreme high and low moods, excessive fear or anxiety, or 
thoughts of suicide, are not provided with medical care in an equal fashion.  The 
disparity between physical and mental health care coverage is reprehensible.  The 
insurance lobby interests, and the fact that mental illness remains misunderstood and 
feared, explain the disparity.256  Insurance lobby efforts and public apprehension are 
revealed  through the narrow scope of the ADA with regard to health insurance.   
“The goals of the ADA - for equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency - are beginning to shape our 
national culture.”257  Those goals have not yet shaped our culture with respect to a 
group of illnesses, which affect one in five Americans, mental illness.  Mental health 
care is important, and necessary; just as important and necessary as physical health 
care or a home to live in.  It is time for a change.  
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